Jonathan Weisberg (left) and Kenny Easwaran (right) on full and partial belief.
An epistemic agent might be more deeply committed to some of her beliefs (e.g., that 2+2=4) than others (e.g., that Obama will be re-elected in 2012). In light of this, many philosophers want to distinguish between full and partial belief. But what precisely is that distinction? Easwaran and Weisberg discuss the issue. Along the way, they consider the lottery paradox (6:29), Easwaran’s view of the merits of an inconsistent belief set (16:17), the motivation to reduce full belief to partial belief (32:18), and the relation between action and knowledge (53:09).
with Branden Fitelson: “An ‘Evidentialist’ Worry About Joyce’s Argument for for Probabilism” (draft)
“Baysianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor” (2011)
“Baysianism II: Applications and Criticisms” (2011)
Sarah Moss, “Epistemology Formalized” (draft)
Brian Weatherson, “Knowledge, Bets, and Interests” (forthcoming)
Richard Foley, Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology (1992)
Richard Foley, “Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis” (2009)
Scott Sturgeon, “Reason and the Grain of Belief” (2008)
David Christensen, Putting Logic in Its Place (2007)
Igor Douven and Timothy Williamson, “Generalizing the Lottery Paradox” (2006)