Philip Goff (left) and David Papineau (right) on physicalism.

Goff rejects physicalism. Papineau accepts it. In this episode, they examine the arguments on each side. They consider the much-discussed “knowledge argument” against physicalism (10:28), explore Goff’s own reasons for rejecting physicalism (17:23), weigh the dualist arguments of Chalmers and Jackson (27:21), discuss Papineau’s reasons to reject the transparency of phenomenal concepts (32:48), ponder what Levine calls the “explanatory gap” (36:19), and confront the specter of epiphenomenalism (47:35).

Related works

by Goff: “A Priori Physicalism, Lonely Ghosts, and Cartesian Doubt” (2012) “A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong” . . . → Read More: Philip Goff and David Papineau]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Philip Goff (left) and David Papineau (right) on physicalism.

Goff rejects physicalism. Papineau accepts it. In this episode, they examine the arguments on each side. They consider the much-discussed “knowledge argument” against physicalism (10:28), explore Goff’s own reasons for rejecting physicalism (17:23), weigh the dualist arguments of Chalmers and Jackson (27:21), discuss Papineau’s reasons to reject the transparency of phenomenal concepts (32:48), ponder what Levine calls the “explanatory gap” (36:19), and confront the specter of epiphenomenalism (47:35).

Related works

by Goff:
“A Priori Physicalism, Lonely Ghosts, and Cartesian Doubt” (2012)
“A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong” (2011)

by Papineau:
“What Exactly Is the Explanatory Gap?” (2010)
Thinking About Consciousness (2004)

Share/Bookmark

Lawrence Krauss (left) and Roy Sorensen (right) on origins and nothingness.

How did our universe get to be the way it is? Has our universe always existed, or did it arise from nothing? Is it even possible for something to come from nothing? Lawrence Krauss has argued that physicists have discovered some of the answers to these ancient philosophical questions; Krauss’s ideas are controversial among certain philosophers. In this conversation, Roy Sorensen and Krauss consider the connections between Darwinian evolution and Krauss’s views (13:50), discuss whether the scientific worldview is particularly depressing (22:41), examine the meaning . . . → Read More: Lawrence Krauss and Roy Sorensen]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Lawrence Krauss (left) and Roy Sorensen (right) on origins and nothingness.

How did our universe get to be the way it is? Has our universe always existed, or did it arise from nothing? Is it even possible for something to come from nothing? Lawrence Krauss has argued that physicists have discovered some of the answers to these ancient philosophical questions; Krauss’s ideas are controversial among certain philosophers. In this conversation, Roy Sorensen and Krauss consider the connections between Darwinian evolution and Krauss’s views (13:50), discuss whether the scientific worldview is particularly depressing (22:41), examine the meaning of questions about “something rather than nothing” (35:25), and explore the nature of nothingness (47:18).

Related works

by Krauss:
A Universe From Nothing (2012)
“The Consolation of Philosophy” (2012)
Video: Conversation between Richard Dawkins and Lawrence Krauss

by Sorensen:
SEP entry on “Nothingness” (2003/2009)
Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows (2008)
Blindspots (1988)

See also:
Leiter Reports: “A Philosopher Defends Krauss”
What There Is And Why There Is Anything: “An Explanation From Nothing?”

Share/Bookmark

Paul Humphreys (left) and John Symons (right) on emergence.

A property is said to be emergent if it arises from but is not reducible to some fundamental property (or set of properties). There is a wide range of properties that might conceivably be emergent; consciousness is the textbook example, which might explain why philosophers of mind are responsible for some of the most fully developed treatments of emergence. In this episode, after discussing some history of the concept of emergence, Humphreys and Symons wrangle over whether emergence is definable (10:01), discuss ways in which debates over . . . → Read More: Paul Humphreys and John Symons]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Paul Humphreys (left) and John Symons (right) on emergence.

A property is said to be emergent if it arises from but is not reducible to some fundamental property (or set of properties). There is a wide range of properties that might conceivably be emergent; consciousness is the textbook example, which might explain why philosophers of mind are responsible for some of the most fully developed treatments of emergence. In this episode, after discussing some history of the concept of emergence, Humphreys and Symons wrangle over whether emergence is definable (10:01), discuss ways in which debates over emergence have spread beyond the philosophy of mind (15:12), and speculate about where those debates might lead in the future (41:01).

Related works

by Humphreys:
“Synchronic and Diachronic Emergence” (2008)
with Mark Bedau (eds.): Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science (2008)
Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism, and Scientific Method (2007)

by Symons:
with Fabio Boschetti: “Novel Properties Generated By Interacting Computational Systems” (2011)
“Computational Models of Emergent Properties” (2008)
“The Meta-Problem of Change” (2009)

Share/Bookmark

Tuomas Tahko (left) and Thomas Hofweber (right) on the foundations of metaphysics.

If metaphysics is a form of genuine inquiry, then presumably metaphysicians investigate questions of fact. But it seems that for any given type of fact, there is already a discipline that investigates facts of that type. For instance, physicists investigate physical facts; mathematicians investigate mathematical facts—and so on. Perhaps there is a special realm of facts investigated only by metaphysicians, but it is unclear what such facts would be like. Alternatively, perhaps metaphysics plays the role of verifying results obtained in other disciplines, but . . . → Read More: Tuomas Tahko and Thomas Hofweber]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Tuomas Tahko (left) and Thomas Hofweber (right) on the foundations of metaphysics.

If metaphysics is a form of genuine inquiry, then presumably metaphysicians investigate questions of fact. But it seems that for any given type of fact, there is already a discipline that investigates facts of that type. For instance, physicists investigate physical facts; mathematicians investigate mathematical facts—and so on. Perhaps there is a special realm of facts investigated only by metaphysicians, but it is unclear what such facts would be like. Alternatively, perhaps metaphysics plays the role of verifying results obtained in other disciplines, but it is unclear that metaphysicians are qualified to check the work of physicists and mathematicians. So what exactly is it that metaphysicians do? In this episode, Tahko and Hofweber grapple with this question.

Related works

by Tahko:
“The Epistemology of Essence” (draft)
“In Defense of Aristotelian Metaphysics” in Tahko (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (2012)
“Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology” (2012)

by Hofweber:
with J. David Velleman: “How to Endure” (2011)
“Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics” in Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (2009)
“The Meta-Problem of Change” (2009)

Share/Bookmark

Click here to view the embedded video.

Part 2:

Click here to view the embedded video.

Kristin Andrews (left) and Robert Lurz (right) on animals and mindreading.

In this two-part conversation*, Andrews and Lurz discuss whether (and to what extent) non-human animals are able to mindread, i.e., understand others’ mental states. In Part 1, they begin with a review of the history of inquiry into animal mindreading, and then examine (starting at 28:18) Andrews’s views about the evolutionary origins and explanatory and predictive roles of mindreading. In Part 2, they discuss Lurz’s plans for experimental investigation of animal mindreading (14:54), Andrews’s and Lurz’s differing . . . → Read More: Kristin Andrews and Robert Lurz]]> Part 1:

Click here to view the embedded video.

Part 2:

Click here to view the embedded video.

Kristin Andrews (left) and Robert Lurz (right) on animals and mindreading.

In this two-part conversation*, Andrews and Lurz discuss whether (and to what extent) non-human animals are able to mindread, i.e., understand others’ mental states. In Part 1, they begin with a review of the history of inquiry into animal mindreading, and then examine (starting at 28:18) Andrews’s views about the evolutionary origins and explanatory and predictive roles of mindreading. In Part 2, they discuss Lurz’s plans for experimental investigation of animal mindreading (14:54), Andrews’s and Lurz’s differing views of the abilities of great apes (32:49), and the relative importance of fieldwork and laboratory evidence (48:47).

The drawing to which Lurz refers at 18:44 is in this paper (p. 25).

*=The conversation was interrupted by a tech snafu, so we divided the video in two.

Related works

by Andrews:
Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology (forthcoming)
“Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals” in The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics (2011)
with Anne Russon: “Orangutan pantomime: elaborating the message” (2010)

by Lurz:
Mindreading Animals: The Debate Over What Animals Know about Other Minds (2011)
with Carla Krachun: “How Could We Know Whether Nonhuman Primates Understand Others’ Internal Goals and Intentions?” (2011)
“Belief Attribution in Animals: On How to Move Forward Conceptually and Empirically” (2010)

Share/Bookmark

Shaun Gallagher (left) and Karsten Stueber (right) on empathy.

Most people possess a substantial (although also limited) ability to know and understand the actions, intentions, and desires of other people. This ability, some think, is explained by our capacity to empathize with one another. In this conversation, Gallagher and Stueber examine the notion of empathy and its importance for debates in the philosophy of mind. They ask: What is empathy? Is empathy an automatic process, or does it require effort? What are the neurological and psychological processes involved in empathy? Does our ability to empathize provide . . . → Read More: Shaun Gallagher and Karsten Stueber]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Shaun Gallagher (left) and Karsten Stueber (right) on empathy.

Most people possess a substantial (although also limited) ability to know and understand the actions, intentions, and desires of other people. This ability, some think, is explained by our capacity to empathize with one another. In this conversation, Gallagher and Stueber examine the notion of empathy and its importance for debates in the philosophy of mind. They ask: What is empathy? Is empathy an automatic process, or does it require effort? What are the neurological and psychological processes involved in empathy? Does our ability to empathize provide us with a reliable guide to the contents of others’ minds, or does empathy routinely mislead us?

Related works

by Gallagher:
“Neurons, neonates and narrative: From embodied resonance to empathic understanding” in Foolen, Lüdtke, Racine and Zlatev (eds.), Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and Emotion in intersubjectivity, consciousness, and language (forthcoming)
“Comment: Three Questions for Stueber” (2012)
Brainstorming: Views and Interviews on the Mind (2008)

by Stueber:
“Varieties of Empathy, Neuroscience and the Narrativist Challenge to the Contemporary Theory of Mind Debate” (2012)
SEP entry on empathy (2008)
Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences (2006)

Share/Bookmark

Katherine Thomson-Jones (left) and George Wilson (right) on cinematic narration.

Some films feature voice-over narration, but most fictional films appear to lack a narrator. And it seems that a narrative requires a narrator. Yet film, like literature, is widely regarded as a narrative art—a story-telling art. So who (if anyone) tells the story conveyed by a film? Relatedly: Perhaps when we engage a fictional film, we imagine that we see the people, places, and events that make up the film’s fictional world. Yet we do not seem to imagine ourselves to be present in the film’s . . . → Read More: Katherine Thomson-Jones and George Wilson]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Katherine Thomson-Jones (left) and George Wilson (right) on cinematic narration.

Some films feature voice-over narration, but most fictional films appear to lack a narrator. And it seems that a narrative requires a narrator. Yet film, like literature, is widely regarded as a narrative art—a story-telling art. So who (if anyone) tells the story conveyed by a film? Relatedly: Perhaps when we engage a fictional film, we imagine that we see the people, places, and events that make up the film’s fictional world. Yet we do not seem to imagine ourselves to be present in the film’s fictional world. (If it’s raining on screen, we do not reach for our umbrellas.) How can we imagine that we see events without imagining that we are present in the same world in which those events occur? In this conversation, Thomson-Jones and Wilson discuss these and other puzzles as they explore the nature and role of narrativity in film.

Related works

by Thomson-Jones:
Aesthetics and Film (2008)
with Kathleen Stock: New Waves in Aesthetics (2008)

by Wilson:
Seeing Fictions in Film: The Epistemology of Movies (2012)
Narration in Light: Studies in Cinematic Point of View (1986)

Share/Bookmark

Mark Alfano (left) and Abrol Fairweather (right) on virtue epistemology.

A long line of virtue ethicists believe that we need to understand the moral virtues—courage, benevolence, temperance, etc.—in order to address core questions in moral philosophy. Lately, there has been a surge of interest in virtue epistmeology, which holds that core questions in epistemology should be addressed in terms of epistemic virtues. In this conversation, Alfano and Fairweather discuss the advantages and challenges of virtue epistemology, with a special focus on issues arising from results in empirical psychology.

Related works

by Alfano: “Extending the Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue . . . → Read More: Mark Alfano and Abrol Fairweather]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Mark Alfano (left) and Abrol Fairweather (right) on virtue epistemology.

A long line of virtue ethicists believe that we need to understand the moral virtues—courage, benevolence, temperance, etc.—in order to address core questions in moral philosophy. Lately, there has been a surge of interest in virtue epistmeology, which holds that core questions in epistemology should be addressed in terms of epistemic virtues. In this conversation, Alfano and Fairweather discuss the advantages and challenges of virtue epistemology, with a special focus on issues arising from results in empirical psychology.

Related works

by Alfano:
“Extending the Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology” (forthcoming)
“Explaining Away Intuitions About Traits: Why Virtue Ethics Seems Plausible (Even if it Isn’t)” (2010)

by Fairweather:
“Duhem-Quine Virtue Epistemology” (forthcoming)
“The Epistemic Value of Good Sense” (forthcoming)
“Epistemic Motivation” in Fairweather and Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays in Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (2001)

Share/Bookmark

Avram Hiller (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on anthropogenic climate change.

Earth’s climate is changing as a result of human emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). How much of this is your fault? For instance, suppose you go on a Sunday drive in a gas-guzzling car just for fun. Then have you done any harm? Sinnott-Armstrong argues (starting at 9:43) that such an action is utterly harmless. But Hiller argues that every GHG-emitting activity—even one Sunday drive—is quantifiably harmful. After discussing their disagreement, Hiller and Sinnott-Armstrong consider a range of other philosophical issues related to climate change: . . . → Read More: Avram Hiller and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Avram Hiller (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on anthropogenic climate change.

Earth’s climate is changing as a result of human emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). How much of this is your fault? For instance, suppose you go on a Sunday drive in a gas-guzzling car just for fun. Then have you done any harm? Sinnott-Armstrong argues (starting at 9:43) that such an action is utterly harmless. But Hiller argues that every GHG-emitting activity—even one Sunday drive—is quantifiably harmful. After discussing their disagreement, Hiller and Sinnott-Armstrong consider a range of other philosophical issues related to climate change: the moral significance of nature (25:32); the ethics of species destruction (31:03); the influence of evolution on our moral intuitions (41:33); and the connections between global warming and global poverty (52:54).

Related works

by Hiller:
“Climate Change and Individual Responsibility” (2011)
“Morally Significant Effects of Ordinary Actions” (2011)

by Sinnott-Armstrong:
“It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations,” in Sinnott-Armstrong and Howarth (eds.), Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics, Vol. 5 (2005)

Share/Bookmark

Elizabeth Brake (left) and Simon May (right) on marriage.

As same-sex marriage gains acceptance, a greater number of caring relationships enjoy legal recognition. But what about polygamous and polyamorous relationships? What about non-romantic relationships, such as friendships? In this episode, Brake and May discuss Brake’s controversial view that individuals should be allowed to assign the rights and privileges of marriage to whomever they want, so long as the purpose is to support a caring relationship. They also discuss the case for same-sex marriage (4:30), whether legal marriage should be abolished (33:48), caring relationships as Rawlsian primary . . . → Read More: Elizabeth Brake and Simon May]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Elizabeth Brake (left) and Simon May (right) on marriage.

As same-sex marriage gains acceptance, a greater number of caring relationships enjoy legal recognition. But what about polygamous and polyamorous relationships? What about non-romantic relationships, such as friendships? In this episode, Brake and May discuss Brake’s controversial view that individuals should be allowed to assign the rights and privileges of marriage to whomever they want, so long as the purpose is to support a caring relationship. They also discuss the case for same-sex marriage (4:30), whether legal marriage should be abolished (33:48), caring relationships as Rawlsian primary goods (45:40), and May’s objection to polygamy (54:49).

Read an excerpt from Brake’s forthcoming book, Minimizing Marriage: Morality, Marriage, and the Law.

Announcement: Jeremy Garrett, Elizabeth Brake, Martha Fineman, and Simon May will participate in a group session entitled “After Marriage” at the Eastern APA meeting, Group Session XIII, Fri., Dec. 30, 1:30pm.

Related works

by Brake:
Minimizing Marriage: Morality, Marriage, and the Law (forthcoming)
“Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law” (2010)

by May:
“Liberal Feminism and the Ethics of Polygamy” (forthcoming)
“Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy” (2009)

See also:
PEA Soup: Discussion of “Minimal Marriage,” with commentary by Cheshire Calhoun

Share/Bookmark