Tuomas Tahko (left) and Thomas Hofweber (right) on the foundations of metaphysics.

If metaphysics is a form of genuine inquiry, then presumably metaphysicians investigate questions of fact. But it seems that for any given type of fact, there is already a discipline that investigates facts of that type. For instance, physicists investigate physical facts; mathematicians investigate mathematical facts—and so on. Perhaps there is a special realm of facts investigated only by metaphysicians, but it is unclear what such facts would be like. Alternatively, perhaps metaphysics plays the role of verifying results obtained in other disciplines, but . . . → Read More: Tuomas Tahko and Thomas Hofweber]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Tuomas Tahko (left) and Thomas Hofweber (right) on the foundations of metaphysics.

If metaphysics is a form of genuine inquiry, then presumably metaphysicians investigate questions of fact. But it seems that for any given type of fact, there is already a discipline that investigates facts of that type. For instance, physicists investigate physical facts; mathematicians investigate mathematical facts—and so on. Perhaps there is a special realm of facts investigated only by metaphysicians, but it is unclear what such facts would be like. Alternatively, perhaps metaphysics plays the role of verifying results obtained in other disciplines, but it is unclear that metaphysicians are qualified to check the work of physicists and mathematicians. So what exactly is it that metaphysicians do? In this episode, Tahko and Hofweber grapple with this question.

Related works

by Tahko:
“The Epistemology of Essence” (draft)
“In Defense of Aristotelian Metaphysics” in Tahko (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (2012)
“Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology” (2012)

by Hofweber:
with J. David Velleman: “How to Endure” (2011)
“Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics” in Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (2009)
“The Meta-Problem of Change” (2009)

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Kristin Andrews (left) and Robert Lurz (right) on animals and mindreading.

In this two-part conversation*, Andrews and Lurz discuss whether (and to what extent) non-human animals are able to mindread, i.e., understand others’ mental states. In Part 1, they begin with a review of the history of inquiry into animal mindreading, and then examine (starting at 28:18) Andrews’s views about the evolutionary origins and explanatory and predictive roles of mindreading. In Part 2, they discuss Lurz’s plans for experimental investigation of animal mindreading (14:54), Andrews’s and Lurz’s differing . . . → Read More: Kristin Andrews and Robert Lurz]]> Part 1:

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Part 2:

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Kristin Andrews (left) and Robert Lurz (right) on animals and mindreading.

In this two-part conversation*, Andrews and Lurz discuss whether (and to what extent) non-human animals are able to mindread, i.e., understand others’ mental states. In Part 1, they begin with a review of the history of inquiry into animal mindreading, and then examine (starting at 28:18) Andrews’s views about the evolutionary origins and explanatory and predictive roles of mindreading. In Part 2, they discuss Lurz’s plans for experimental investigation of animal mindreading (14:54), Andrews’s and Lurz’s differing views of the abilities of great apes (32:49), and the relative importance of fieldwork and laboratory evidence (48:47).

The drawing to which Lurz refers at 18:44 is in this paper (p. 25).

*=The conversation was interrupted by a tech snafu, so we divided the video in two.

Related works

by Andrews:
Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology (forthcoming)
“Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals” in The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics (2011)
with Anne Russon: “Orangutan pantomime: elaborating the message” (2010)

by Lurz:
Mindreading Animals: The Debate Over What Animals Know about Other Minds (2011)
with Carla Krachun: “How Could We Know Whether Nonhuman Primates Understand Others’ Internal Goals and Intentions?” (2011)
“Belief Attribution in Animals: On How to Move Forward Conceptually and Empirically” (2010)

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Shaun Gallagher (left) and Karsten Stueber (right) on empathy.

Most people possess a substantial (although also limited) ability to know and understand the actions, intentions, and desires of other people. This ability, some think, is explained by our capacity to empathize with one another. In this conversation, Gallagher and Stueber examine the notion of empathy and its importance for debates in the philosophy of mind. They ask: What is empathy? Is empathy an automatic process, or does it require effort? What are the neurological and psychological processes involved in empathy? Does our ability to empathize provide . . . → Read More: Shaun Gallagher and Karsten Stueber]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Shaun Gallagher (left) and Karsten Stueber (right) on empathy.

Most people possess a substantial (although also limited) ability to know and understand the actions, intentions, and desires of other people. This ability, some think, is explained by our capacity to empathize with one another. In this conversation, Gallagher and Stueber examine the notion of empathy and its importance for debates in the philosophy of mind. They ask: What is empathy? Is empathy an automatic process, or does it require effort? What are the neurological and psychological processes involved in empathy? Does our ability to empathize provide us with a reliable guide to the contents of others’ minds, or does empathy routinely mislead us?

Related works

by Gallagher:
“Neurons, neonates and narrative: From embodied resonance to empathic understanding” in Foolen, Lüdtke, Racine and Zlatev (eds.), Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and Emotion in intersubjectivity, consciousness, and language (forthcoming)
“Comment: Three Questions for Stueber” (2012)
Brainstorming: Views and Interviews on the Mind (2008)

by Stueber:
“Varieties of Empathy, Neuroscience and the Narrativist Challenge to the Contemporary Theory of Mind Debate” (2012)
SEP entry on empathy (2008)
Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences (2006)

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Katherine Thomson-Jones (left) and George Wilson (right) on cinematic narration.

Some films feature voice-over narration, but most fictional films appear to lack a narrator. And it seems that a narrative requires a narrator. Yet film, like literature, is widely regarded as a narrative art—a story-telling art. So who (if anyone) tells the story conveyed by a film? Relatedly: Perhaps when we engage a fictional film, we imagine that we see the people, places, and events that make up the film’s fictional world. Yet we do not seem to imagine ourselves to be present in the film’s . . . → Read More: Katherine Thomson-Jones and George Wilson]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Katherine Thomson-Jones (left) and George Wilson (right) on cinematic narration.

Some films feature voice-over narration, but most fictional films appear to lack a narrator. And it seems that a narrative requires a narrator. Yet film, like literature, is widely regarded as a narrative art—a story-telling art. So who (if anyone) tells the story conveyed by a film? Relatedly: Perhaps when we engage a fictional film, we imagine that we see the people, places, and events that make up the film’s fictional world. Yet we do not seem to imagine ourselves to be present in the film’s fictional world. (If it’s raining on screen, we do not reach for our umbrellas.) How can we imagine that we see events without imagining that we are present in the same world in which those events occur? In this conversation, Thomson-Jones and Wilson discuss these and other puzzles as they explore the nature and role of narrativity in film.

Related works

by Thomson-Jones:
Aesthetics and Film (2008)
with Kathleen Stock: New Waves in Aesthetics (2008)

by Wilson:
Seeing Fictions in Film: The Epistemology of Movies (2012)
Narration in Light: Studies in Cinematic Point of View (1986)

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Mark Alfano (left) and Abrol Fairweather (right) on virtue epistemology.

A long line of virtue ethicists believe that we need to understand the moral virtues—courage, benevolence, temperance, etc.—in order to address core questions in moral philosophy. Lately, there has been a surge of interest in virtue epistmeology, which holds that core questions in epistemology should be addressed in terms of epistemic virtues. In this conversation, Alfano and Fairweather discuss the advantages and challenges of virtue epistemology, with a special focus on issues arising from results in empirical psychology.

Related works

by Alfano: “Extending the Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue . . . → Read More: Mark Alfano and Abrol Fairweather]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Mark Alfano (left) and Abrol Fairweather (right) on virtue epistemology.

A long line of virtue ethicists believe that we need to understand the moral virtues—courage, benevolence, temperance, etc.—in order to address core questions in moral philosophy. Lately, there has been a surge of interest in virtue epistmeology, which holds that core questions in epistemology should be addressed in terms of epistemic virtues. In this conversation, Alfano and Fairweather discuss the advantages and challenges of virtue epistemology, with a special focus on issues arising from results in empirical psychology.

Related works

by Alfano:
“Extending the Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology” (forthcoming)
“Explaining Away Intuitions About Traits: Why Virtue Ethics Seems Plausible (Even if it Isn’t)” (2010)

by Fairweather:
“Duhem-Quine Virtue Epistemology” (forthcoming)
“The Epistemic Value of Good Sense” (forthcoming)
“Epistemic Motivation” in Fairweather and Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays in Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (2001)

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Avram Hiller (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on anthropogenic climate change.

Earth’s climate is changing as a result of human emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). How much of this is your fault? For instance, suppose you go on a Sunday drive in a gas-guzzling car just for fun. Then have you done any harm? Sinnott-Armstrong argues (starting at 9:43) that such an action is utterly harmless. But Hiller argues that every GHG-emitting activity—even one Sunday drive—is quantifiably harmful. After discussing their disagreement, Hiller and Sinnott-Armstrong consider a range of other philosophical issues related to climate change: . . . → Read More: Avram Hiller and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Avram Hiller (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on anthropogenic climate change.

Earth’s climate is changing as a result of human emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). How much of this is your fault? For instance, suppose you go on a Sunday drive in a gas-guzzling car just for fun. Then have you done any harm? Sinnott-Armstrong argues (starting at 9:43) that such an action is utterly harmless. But Hiller argues that every GHG-emitting activity—even one Sunday drive—is quantifiably harmful. After discussing their disagreement, Hiller and Sinnott-Armstrong consider a range of other philosophical issues related to climate change: the moral significance of nature (25:32); the ethics of species destruction (31:03); the influence of evolution on our moral intuitions (41:33); and the connections between global warming and global poverty (52:54).

Related works

by Hiller:
“Climate Change and Individual Responsibility” (2011)
“Morally Significant Effects of Ordinary Actions” (2011)

by Sinnott-Armstrong:
“It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations,” in Sinnott-Armstrong and Howarth (eds.), Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics, Vol. 5 (2005)

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Elizabeth Brake (left) and Simon May (right) on marriage.

As same-sex marriage gains acceptance, a greater number of caring relationships enjoy legal recognition. But what about polygamous and polyamorous relationships? What about non-romantic relationships, such as friendships? In this episode, Brake and May discuss Brake’s controversial view that individuals should be allowed to assign the rights and privileges of marriage to whomever they want, so long as the purpose is to support a caring relationship. They also discuss the case for same-sex marriage (4:30), whether legal marriage should be abolished (33:48), caring relationships as Rawlsian primary . . . → Read More: Elizabeth Brake and Simon May]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Elizabeth Brake (left) and Simon May (right) on marriage.

As same-sex marriage gains acceptance, a greater number of caring relationships enjoy legal recognition. But what about polygamous and polyamorous relationships? What about non-romantic relationships, such as friendships? In this episode, Brake and May discuss Brake’s controversial view that individuals should be allowed to assign the rights and privileges of marriage to whomever they want, so long as the purpose is to support a caring relationship. They also discuss the case for same-sex marriage (4:30), whether legal marriage should be abolished (33:48), caring relationships as Rawlsian primary goods (45:40), and May’s objection to polygamy (54:49).

Read an excerpt from Brake’s forthcoming book, Minimizing Marriage: Morality, Marriage, and the Law.

Announcement: Jeremy Garrett, Elizabeth Brake, Martha Fineman, and Simon May will participate in a group session entitled “After Marriage” at the Eastern APA meeting, Group Session XIII, Fri., Dec. 30, 1:30pm.

Related works

by Brake:
Minimizing Marriage: Morality, Marriage, and the Law (forthcoming)
“Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law” (2010)

by May:
“Liberal Feminism and the Ethics of Polygamy” (forthcoming)
“Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy” (2009)

See also:
PEA Soup: Discussion of “Minimal Marriage,” with commentary by Cheshire Calhoun

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Owen Flanagan (left) and Alex Rosenberg (right) on the significance of naturalism.

Naturalists believe that the world is scientifically intelligible (at least in principle). Thus, naturalists doubt the reality of anything that cannot fit into a scientific worldview. How discomforting are naturalists’ doubts? Can naturalists coherently regard life as meaningful? Rosenberg is happily pessimistic about the answers to such questions. In this conversation, Rosenberg defends his pessimism, and Flanagan resists it. They discuss whether Darwin banished purpose (17:27), why naturalists get up in the morning (34:30), and morality and politics from a naturalist perspective (49:45), among . . . → Read More: Owen Flanagan and Alex Rosenberg]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Owen Flanagan (left) and Alex Rosenberg (right) on the significance of naturalism.

Naturalists believe that the world is scientifically intelligible (at least in principle). Thus, naturalists doubt the reality of anything that cannot fit into a scientific worldview. How discomforting are naturalists’ doubts? Can naturalists coherently regard life as meaningful? Rosenberg is happily pessimistic about the answers to such questions. In this conversation, Rosenberg defends his pessimism, and Flanagan resists it. They discuss whether Darwin banished purpose (17:27), why naturalists get up in the morning (34:30), and morality and politics from a naturalist perspective (49:45), among other topics.

Related works

by Flanagan:
The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized (2011)
The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World (2009)

by Rosenberg:
The Atheist’s Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions (2011)
with Tamler Sommers: “Darwin’s Nihilistic Idea: Evolution and the Meaninglessness of Life” (2003)

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Jason Brennan (left) and Kevin Vallier (right) on political liberalism and religion.

According to some prominent versions of political liberalism, coercive political force is illegitimate unless it is justifiable from every reasonable point of view. But there are many reasonable points of view from which religious beliefs cannot be justified. This seems to mean that religious political convictions are in conflict with political liberalism. However, Vallier resists that conclusion; he thinks that religious reasoning can have a legitimate role in political discourse. In this episode, Brennan and Vallier discuss Vallier’s argument.

Related works

by Brennan: The Ethics of . . . → Read More: Jason Brennan and Kevin Vallier]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Jason Brennan (left) and Kevin Vallier (right) on political liberalism and religion.

According to some prominent versions of political liberalism, coercive political force is illegitimate unless it is justifiable from every reasonable point of view. But there are many reasonable points of view from which religious beliefs cannot be justified. This seems to mean that religious political convictions are in conflict with political liberalism. However, Vallier resists that conclusion; he thinks that religious reasoning can have a legitimate role in political discourse. In this episode, Brennan and Vallier discuss Vallier’s argument.

Related works

by Brennan:
The Ethics of Voting (2011)
“The Right to a Competent Electorate” (forthcoming)

by Vallier:
“Liberalism, Religion, and Integrity” (forthcoming)
“Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason” (forthcoming)
with Gerald Gaus: “The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institutions” (2009)

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Matt Bedke (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on ethical intuitions.

Bedke and Sinnott-Armstrong consider the extent to which we can justifiably trust our ethical intuitions. They discuss the analogy between ethical intuitions and color perceptions (2:55), a potential difference between ethical intuitions and non-ethical philosophical intuitions (19:45), Sinnott-Armstrong’s work on framing effects (27:11), and Bedke’s critique of non-naturalist ethical intuitionism (60:44), among other topics.

Related works

by Bedke: “Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics” (2010) “Intuitive Non-Naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence” (2009) “Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify” (2008)

by Sinnott-Armstrong: “Framing Moral Intuitions” (2008) Moral Psychology: volumes 1-3 (2008) Moral . . . → Read More: Matt Bedke and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Matt Bedke (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on ethical intuitions.

Bedke and Sinnott-Armstrong consider the extent to which we can justifiably trust our ethical intuitions. They discuss the analogy between ethical intuitions and color perceptions (2:55), a potential difference between ethical intuitions and non-ethical philosophical intuitions (19:45), Sinnott-Armstrong’s work on framing effects (27:11), and Bedke’s critique of non-naturalist ethical intuitionism (60:44), among other topics.

Related works

by Bedke:
“Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics” (2010)
“Intuitive Non-Naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence” (2009)
“Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify” (2008)

by Sinnott-Armstrong:
“Framing Moral Intuitions” (2008)
Moral Psychology: volumes 1-3 (2008)
Moral Skepticisms (2006)
Pyrrhonian Skepticism (2004)

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