Katherine Thomson-Jones (left) and George Wilson (right) on cinematic narration.

Some films feature voice-over narration, but most fictional films appear to lack a narrator. And it seems that a narrative requires a narrator. Yet film, like literature, is widely regarded as a narrative art—a story-telling art. So who (if anyone) tells the story conveyed by a film? Relatedly: Perhaps when we engage a fictional film, we imagine that we see the people, places, and events that make up the film’s fictional world. Yet we do not seem to imagine ourselves to be present in the film’s . . . → Read More: Katherine Thomson-Jones and George Wilson]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Katherine Thomson-Jones (left) and George Wilson (right) on cinematic narration.

Some films feature voice-over narration, but most fictional films appear to lack a narrator. And it seems that a narrative requires a narrator. Yet film, like literature, is widely regarded as a narrative art—a story-telling art. So who (if anyone) tells the story conveyed by a film? Relatedly: Perhaps when we engage a fictional film, we imagine that we see the people, places, and events that make up the film’s fictional world. Yet we do not seem to imagine ourselves to be present in the film’s fictional world. (If it’s raining on screen, we do not reach for our umbrellas.) How can we imagine that we see events without imagining that we are present in the same world in which those events occur? In this conversation, Thomson-Jones and Wilson discuss these and other puzzles as they explore the nature and role of narrativity in film.

Related works

by Thomson-Jones:
Aesthetics and Film (2008)
with Kathleen Stock: New Waves in Aesthetics (2008)

by Wilson:
Seeing Fictions in Film: The Epistemology of Movies (2012)
Narration in Light: Studies in Cinematic Point of View (1986)

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Mark Alfano (left) and Abrol Fairweather (right) on virtue epistemology.

A long line of virtue ethicists believe that we need to understand the moral virtues—courage, benevolence, temperance, etc.—in order to address core questions in moral philosophy. Lately, there has been a surge of interest in virtue epistmeology, which holds that core questions in epistemology should be addressed in terms of epistemic virtues. In this conversation, Alfano and Fairweather discuss the advantages and challenges of virtue epistemology, with a special focus on issues arising from results in empirical psychology.

Related works

by Alfano: “Extending the Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue . . . → Read More: Mark Alfano and Abrol Fairweather]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Mark Alfano (left) and Abrol Fairweather (right) on virtue epistemology.

A long line of virtue ethicists believe that we need to understand the moral virtues—courage, benevolence, temperance, etc.—in order to address core questions in moral philosophy. Lately, there has been a surge of interest in virtue epistmeology, which holds that core questions in epistemology should be addressed in terms of epistemic virtues. In this conversation, Alfano and Fairweather discuss the advantages and challenges of virtue epistemology, with a special focus on issues arising from results in empirical psychology.

Related works

by Alfano:
“Extending the Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology” (forthcoming)
“Explaining Away Intuitions About Traits: Why Virtue Ethics Seems Plausible (Even if it Isn’t)” (2010)

by Fairweather:
“Duhem-Quine Virtue Epistemology” (forthcoming)
“The Epistemic Value of Good Sense” (forthcoming)
“Epistemic Motivation” in Fairweather and Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays in Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (2001)

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Avram Hiller (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on anthropogenic climate change.

Earth’s climate is changing as a result of human emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). How much of this is your fault? For instance, suppose you go on a Sunday drive in a gas-guzzling car just for fun. Then have you done any harm? Sinnott-Armstrong argues (starting at 9:43) that such an action is utterly harmless. But Hiller argues that every GHG-emitting activity—even one Sunday drive—is quantifiably harmful. After discussing their disagreement, Hiller and Sinnott-Armstrong consider a range of other philosophical issues related to climate change: . . . → Read More: Avram Hiller and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Avram Hiller (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on anthropogenic climate change.

Earth’s climate is changing as a result of human emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). How much of this is your fault? For instance, suppose you go on a Sunday drive in a gas-guzzling car just for fun. Then have you done any harm? Sinnott-Armstrong argues (starting at 9:43) that such an action is utterly harmless. But Hiller argues that every GHG-emitting activity—even one Sunday drive—is quantifiably harmful. After discussing their disagreement, Hiller and Sinnott-Armstrong consider a range of other philosophical issues related to climate change: the moral significance of nature (25:32); the ethics of species destruction (31:03); the influence of evolution on our moral intuitions (41:33); and the connections between global warming and global poverty (52:54).

Related works

by Hiller:
“Climate Change and Individual Responsibility” (2011)
“Morally Significant Effects of Ordinary Actions” (2011)

by Sinnott-Armstrong:
“It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations,” in Sinnott-Armstrong and Howarth (eds.), Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics, Vol. 5 (2005)

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Elizabeth Brake (left) and Simon May (right) on marriage.

As same-sex marriage gains acceptance, a greater number of caring relationships enjoy legal recognition. But what about polygamous and polyamorous relationships? What about non-romantic relationships, such as friendships? In this episode, Brake and May discuss Brake’s controversial view that individuals should be allowed to assign the rights and privileges of marriage to whomever they want, so long as the purpose is to support a caring relationship. They also discuss the case for same-sex marriage (4:30), whether legal marriage should be abolished (33:48), caring relationships as Rawlsian primary . . . → Read More: Elizabeth Brake and Simon May]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Elizabeth Brake (left) and Simon May (right) on marriage.

As same-sex marriage gains acceptance, a greater number of caring relationships enjoy legal recognition. But what about polygamous and polyamorous relationships? What about non-romantic relationships, such as friendships? In this episode, Brake and May discuss Brake’s controversial view that individuals should be allowed to assign the rights and privileges of marriage to whomever they want, so long as the purpose is to support a caring relationship. They also discuss the case for same-sex marriage (4:30), whether legal marriage should be abolished (33:48), caring relationships as Rawlsian primary goods (45:40), and May’s objection to polygamy (54:49).

Read an excerpt from Brake’s forthcoming book, Minimizing Marriage: Morality, Marriage, and the Law.

Announcement: Jeremy Garrett, Elizabeth Brake, Martha Fineman, and Simon May will participate in a group session entitled “After Marriage” at the Eastern APA meeting, Group Session XIII, Fri., Dec. 30, 1:30pm.

Related works

by Brake:
Minimizing Marriage: Morality, Marriage, and the Law (forthcoming)
“Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law” (2010)

by May:
“Liberal Feminism and the Ethics of Polygamy” (forthcoming)
“Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy” (2009)

See also:
PEA Soup: Discussion of “Minimal Marriage,” with commentary by Cheshire Calhoun

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Owen Flanagan (left) and Alex Rosenberg (right) on the significance of naturalism.

Naturalists believe that the world is scientifically intelligible (at least in principle). Thus, naturalists doubt the reality of anything that cannot fit into a scientific worldview. How discomforting are naturalists’ doubts? Can naturalists coherently regard life as meaningful? Rosenberg is happily pessimistic about the answers to such questions. In this conversation, Rosenberg defends his pessimism, and Flanagan resists it. They discuss whether Darwin banished purpose (17:27), why naturalists get up in the morning (34:30), and morality and politics from a naturalist perspective (49:45), among . . . → Read More: Owen Flanagan and Alex Rosenberg]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Owen Flanagan (left) and Alex Rosenberg (right) on the significance of naturalism.

Naturalists believe that the world is scientifically intelligible (at least in principle). Thus, naturalists doubt the reality of anything that cannot fit into a scientific worldview. How discomforting are naturalists’ doubts? Can naturalists coherently regard life as meaningful? Rosenberg is happily pessimistic about the answers to such questions. In this conversation, Rosenberg defends his pessimism, and Flanagan resists it. They discuss whether Darwin banished purpose (17:27), why naturalists get up in the morning (34:30), and morality and politics from a naturalist perspective (49:45), among other topics.

Related works

by Flanagan:
The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized (2011)
The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World (2009)

by Rosenberg:
The Atheist’s Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions (2011)
with Tamler Sommers: “Darwin’s Nihilistic Idea: Evolution and the Meaninglessness of Life” (2003)

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Jason Brennan (left) and Kevin Vallier (right) on political liberalism and religion.

According to some prominent versions of political liberalism, coercive political force is illegitimate unless it is justifiable from every reasonable point of view. But there are many reasonable points of view from which religious beliefs cannot be justified. This seems to mean that religious political convictions are in conflict with political liberalism. However, Vallier resists that conclusion; he thinks that religious reasoning can have a legitimate role in political discourse. In this episode, Brennan and Vallier discuss Vallier’s argument.

Related works

by Brennan: The Ethics of . . . → Read More: Jason Brennan and Kevin Vallier]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Jason Brennan (left) and Kevin Vallier (right) on political liberalism and religion.

According to some prominent versions of political liberalism, coercive political force is illegitimate unless it is justifiable from every reasonable point of view. But there are many reasonable points of view from which religious beliefs cannot be justified. This seems to mean that religious political convictions are in conflict with political liberalism. However, Vallier resists that conclusion; he thinks that religious reasoning can have a legitimate role in political discourse. In this episode, Brennan and Vallier discuss Vallier’s argument.

Related works

by Brennan:
The Ethics of Voting (2011)
“The Right to a Competent Electorate” (forthcoming)

by Vallier:
“Liberalism, Religion, and Integrity” (forthcoming)
“Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason” (forthcoming)
with Gerald Gaus: “The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institutions” (2009)

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Matt Bedke (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on ethical intuitions.

Bedke and Sinnott-Armstrong consider the extent to which we can justifiably trust our ethical intuitions. They discuss the analogy between ethical intuitions and color perceptions (2:55), a potential difference between ethical intuitions and non-ethical philosophical intuitions (19:45), Sinnott-Armstrong’s work on framing effects (27:11), and Bedke’s critique of non-naturalist ethical intuitionism (60:44), among other topics.

Related works

by Bedke: “Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics” (2010) “Intuitive Non-Naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence” (2009) “Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify” (2008)

by Sinnott-Armstrong: “Framing Moral Intuitions” (2008) Moral Psychology: volumes 1-3 (2008) Moral . . . → Read More: Matt Bedke and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Matt Bedke (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on ethical intuitions.

Bedke and Sinnott-Armstrong consider the extent to which we can justifiably trust our ethical intuitions. They discuss the analogy between ethical intuitions and color perceptions (2:55), a potential difference between ethical intuitions and non-ethical philosophical intuitions (19:45), Sinnott-Armstrong’s work on framing effects (27:11), and Bedke’s critique of non-naturalist ethical intuitionism (60:44), among other topics.

Related works

by Bedke:
“Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics” (2010)
“Intuitive Non-Naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence” (2009)
“Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify” (2008)

by Sinnott-Armstrong:
“Framing Moral Intuitions” (2008)
Moral Psychology: volumes 1-3 (2008)
Moral Skepticisms (2006)
Pyrrhonian Skepticism (2004)

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Jonathan Weisberg (left) and Kenny Easwaran (right) on full and partial belief.

An epistemic agent might be more deeply committed to some of her beliefs (e.g., that 2+2=4) than others (e.g., that Obama will be re-elected in 2012). In light of this, many philosophers want to distinguish between full and partial belief. But what precisely is that distinction? Easwaran and Weisberg discuss the issue. Along the way, they consider the lottery paradox (6:29), Easwaran’s view of the merits of an inconsistent belief set (16:17), the motivation to reduce full belief to partial belief (32:18), and the . . . → Read More: Jonathan Weisberg and Kenny Easwaran]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Jonathan Weisberg (left) and Kenny Easwaran (right) on full and partial belief.

An epistemic agent might be more deeply committed to some of her beliefs (e.g., that 2+2=4) than others (e.g., that Obama will be re-elected in 2012). In light of this, many philosophers want to distinguish between full and partial belief. But what precisely is that distinction? Easwaran and Weisberg discuss the issue. Along the way, they consider the lottery paradox (6:29), Easwaran’s view of the merits of an inconsistent belief set (16:17), the motivation to reduce full belief to partial belief (32:18), and the relation between action and knowledge (53:09).

Related works

by Easwaran:
with Branden Fitelson: “An ‘Evidentialist’ Worry About Joyce’s Argument for for Probabilism” (draft)
“Baysianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor” (2011)
“Baysianism II: Applications and Criticisms” (2011)

by Weisberg:
“Varieties of Baysianism” (2011), esp. section 7
“Bootstrapping in General” (2010)

See also:
Sarah Moss, “Epistemology Formalized” (draft)
Brian Weatherson, “Knowledge, Bets, and Interests” (forthcoming)
Richard Foley, Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology (1992)
Richard Foley, “Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis” (2009)
Scott Sturgeon, “Reason and the Grain of Belief” (2008)
David Christensen, Putting Logic in Its Place (2007)
Igor Douven and Timothy Williamson, “Generalizing the Lottery Paradox” (2006)

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Graham Hubbs (left) and Michael O’Rourke (right) on philosophical intervention.

The Toolbox Project, helmed by O’Rourke, applies philosophy to problems of cross-disciplinary cooperation among scientists. In this interview, Hubbs and O’Rourke discuss the goals and methods of the project, the stigma of applied philosophy, and the extent to which deep philosophical issues (e.g. in philosophy of language) are relevant in other disciplines.

Related works

Crowley, Eigenbrode, O’Rourke, and Wulfhorst, “Cross-disciplinary localization: a philosophical approach” (2010) Eigenbrode, O’Rourke, et al., “Employing Philosophical Dialogue in Collaborative Science” (2007) Hubbs, “Is There a Mechanism of Critical Reasoning?” (draft)

More video: Dale Jamieson & Jay Odenbaugh . . . → Read More: Graham Hubbs and Michael O’Rourke]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Graham Hubbs (left) and Michael O’Rourke (right) on philosophical intervention.

The Toolbox Project, helmed by O’Rourke, applies philosophy to problems of cross-disciplinary cooperation among scientists. In this interview, Hubbs and O’Rourke discuss the goals and methods of the project, the stigma of applied philosophy, and the extent to which deep philosophical issues (e.g. in philosophy of language) are relevant in other disciplines.

Related works

Crowley, Eigenbrode, O’Rourke, and Wulfhorst, “Cross-disciplinary localization: a philosophical approach” (2010)
Eigenbrode, O’Rourke, et al., “Employing Philosophical Dialogue in Collaborative Science” (2007)
Hubbs, “Is There a Mechanism of Critical Reasoning?” (draft)

More video:
Dale Jamieson & Jay Odenbaugh (PTV)
David Christensen & Roy Sorensen (PTV)

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Alvin Goldman (left) and Jennifer Lackey (right) on social epistemology.

Can a football team know more than its individual members know? How can a non-expert tell that an expert’s testimony is trustworthy? How should we modify our beliefs in response to disagreements with others? These are some of the questions encompassed by social epistemology, which deals with social aspects of knowledge and belief. In this conversation, Goldman and Lackey provide an overview of this growing subfield.

Related works

by Goldman: with Dennis Whitcomb (eds.): Social Epistemology: Essential Readings (2011) Knowledge in a Social World (1999)

by Lackey: Learning from Words: Testimony . . . → Read More: Alvin Goldman and Jennifer Lackey]]> Click here to view the embedded video.

Alvin Goldman (left) and Jennifer Lackey (right) on social epistemology.

Can a football team know more than its individual members know? How can a non-expert tell that an expert’s testimony is trustworthy? How should we modify our beliefs in response to disagreements with others? These are some of the questions encompassed by social epistemology, which deals with social aspects of knowledge and belief. In this conversation, Goldman and Lackey provide an overview of this growing subfield.

Related works

by Goldman:
with Dennis Whitcomb (eds.): Social Epistemology: Essential Readings (2011)
Knowledge in a Social World (1999)

by Lackey:
Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge (2010)
with Ernest Sosa (eds.): The Epistemology of Testimony (2006)

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