Edouard Machery and Jesse Prinz

Edouard Machery (left) and Jesse Prinz (right) on concepts.

Machery and Prinz discuss whether a single theory of concepts can satisfy the different explanatory needs of both philosophers and psychologists. Then (starting at 30:52) Machery argues for the surprising thesis that psychologists ought to do away with talk of concepts altogether. Finally (starting at 49:41) Prinz explains his empiricist view of concepts and takes on Machery’s objections to it.

Related works

by Machery:
Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz” (2010)
Doing without Concepts (2009)

by Prinz:
Can Concept Empiricism Forestall Eliminativism?” (2010)
Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis (2002)

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