Philosophy TV Managing Editors

David Killoren (Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry, Australian Catholic University)

Jonathan Lang (Wisconsin Institute for Sleep and Consciousness, University of Wisconsin-Madison)


David Enoch and Mark Schroeder

David Enoch (left) and Mark Schroeder (right) on moral realism.

Enoch and Schroeder are moral realists of different kinds: Schroeder defends a form of naturalist reductionism, while Enoch defends a form of Moorean non-naturalism. In this conversation, they compare their two brands of realism, discuss their shared opposition to error theories and expressivism, and address a few of the standard objections to realism. Then (at 53:40) they reveal their answers to a question that should be disturbing to any realist: If it turns out that realism is false, what would you believe instead?

Related works

by Enoch:
TOC and chapter abstracts from Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism (forthcoming)
The Epistemological Challenge to Metanormative Realism” (2009)
An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism” (2007)

by Schroeder:
with Johannes Schmitt: “Supervenience Arguments Under Relaxed Assumptions” (forthcoming)
Slaves of the Passions (2008)
Realism and Reduction: the Quest for Robustness” (2005)

More video:
Jamie Dreier and Mark Schroeder (PTV)


3 comments to David Enoch and Mark Schroeder

  • John

    Great discussion! Thanks. You varied in using the names Moorean and Platonic realism during the talk I think. Are those subtypes of realist views or just two names for the same view?

  • David Enoch

    We were (especially — I was) being a little loose with the use of these terms. In the loose way in which I was using them, they are interchangeable, I think. Both stand for a fairly robust kind of realism, according to which moral truths and facts and properties are sui generis, not reducible to natural ones. There are other kinds of realism too, of course.

  • Very good discussion.
    Thanks you so much