Al Mele and Eddy Nahmias on free will and science.
Mele and Nahmias start by explaining how they first became seriously interested in the relationship of free will to science. Then (12:44) they discuss the infamous Libet experiments, which are often interpreted as evidence that our conscious decisions are determined by earlier nonconscious brain […]
Gregg Caruso and Bruce Waller on free will and moral responsibility.
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Most people believe that we can and should be held morally responsible for our actions. Caruso and Waller both hold that this belief is not only false, but harmful. They recommend that we abandon the notion of […]
Richard Brown (left) and Keith Frankish (right) on qualia.
Suppose you’re a physicalist and you want to include qualia in your ontology. Unfortunately, “classic qualia” (intrinsic, ineffable, private properties of experience) seem incompatible with physicalism, while “zero qualia” (mere dispositions to judge that we have classic qualia) don’t seem like genuine qualia at all. […]
Edouard Machery (left) and Jesse Prinz (right) on concepts.
Machery and Prinz discuss whether a single theory of concepts can satisfy the different explanatory needs of both philosophers and psychologists. Then (starting at 30:52) Machery argues for the surprising thesis that psychologists ought to do away with talk of concepts altogether. Finally (starting at […]
Alex Byrne (left) and Brie Gertler (right) on self-knowledge of beliefs.
In this conversation, Byrne and Gertler closely examine Gareth Evans’s “transparency procedure” for gaining self-knowledge of beliefs. According to the transparency procedure, one determines whether one believes that p simply by considering whether p is true (rather than via direct access to one’s […]
Peter Carruthers (left) and Eric Schwitzgebel (right) on self-knowledge of attitudes.
According to an intuitively plausible and widely accepted view, we have direct, privileged, and highly reliable access to our own beliefs. In the first part of this conversation, Carruthers and Schwitzgebel both reject that view, while disagreeing about the exact implications of empirical […]
Tamar Gendler (left) and Eric Schwitzgebel (right) on implicit associations and belief.
Most of us explicitly renounce racist beliefs. Yet empirical work suggests that, for many people, their implicit racial associations are in tension with their explicit avowals. So what do we really believe? Gendler contends that, in general, our implicit associations (which she […]