Category Archives: x-phi

by | August 18, 2014 · 10:21 pm

Al Mele and Eddy Nahmias

Al Mele and Eddy Nahmias on free will and science.

Mele and Nahmias start by explaining how they first became seriously interested in the relationship of free will to science. Then (12:44) they discuss the infamous Libet experiments, which are often interpreted as evidence that our conscious decisions are determined by earlier nonconscious brain activity, along with a range of other experiments in neuroscience that also bear on issues concerning human free agency. Next (25:31) they consider general worries that underlie neuroscientific investigations of free will. Then (41:28) they discuss whether (and how) results in social psychology could undermine free human agency. After that, they discuss future prospects for scientific investigation of free will (46:14), including Mele’s (exceptionally generous) Templeton-sponsored grants. They conclude (53:55) with some reflections on the definition of free will.

The deadline for the Philosophy of Self-Control grant applications is Sept. 1, 2014.

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Filed under Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology, x-phi

by | August 5, 2014 · 12:18 pm

Justin Sytsma and Adam Arico

Justin Sytsma and Adam Arico on folk intuitions about phenomenal experience.

Note: This is the final entry in a series of PTV discussions involving contributors to Machery and O’Neill (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy (2014)

Sytsma and Arico begin with an overview of empirical investigations of folk intuitions about phenomenal consciousness. Then (15:03) they consider the landmark 2010 study by Sytsma and Machery, which produced evidence that the folk are largely willing to ascribe perceptual experience (“seeing red”) to a simple robot, but unwilling to ascribe bodily sensation (“feeling pain”) to the robot. (Interestingly, the same study also probed philosophers’ responses, which turned out to differ from those of the folk.) After that, they discuss (20:15) whether the Agency Model developed by Arico and colleagues can adequately account for the Sytsma and Machery results, and consider a range of other interpretations and follow-up studies. They conclude (53:58) by considering possibilities for future empirical work on folk views of phenomenal consciousness.

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Filed under Philosophy of Mind, x-phi

by | June 20, 2014 · 1:23 am

Genoveva Marti and Edouard Machery

Genoveva Marti and Edouard Machery on reference and experimental philosophy.

Note: This is part of a series of PTV discussions involving contributors to Machery and O’Neill (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy (2014)

According to descriptivist theories of reference, when a given word refers to a given individual, it’s because the individual satisfies a description associated with the word. (For example, on this view, “Barack Obama” refers to Barack Obama because Barack Obama satisfies a certain description: he is the 44th president of the United States, etc.) By contrast, according to causal theories of reference, what makes it possible for a word to refer is that it is part of a chain of communication that leads back to the introduction of the word as a name for its referent. (For example, on this view, “Barack Obama” refers to Barack Obama just because Barack Obama was given that name by his parents.)

In this conversation, Machery and Marti debate the implications of empirical studies, conducted by Machery and others, that explore folk judgments about reference. After an overview of the main theories of reference, they discuss studies by Machery et al. on cross-cultural differences in so-called “metalinguistic judgments” (10:14). These studies, Machery argues, suggest that North Americans’ intuitions about reference are in line with a causal theory of reference, whereas East Asians’ intuitions are in line with a descriptivist theory. Marti raises doubts about the relevance of such studies for semantic theorizing (19:11), and Machery responds (27:52). Then they discuss whether Marti’s critique amounts to a call for reform in theorizing about reference (30:39), debate whether metalinguistic judgments reflect an implicit theory of proper names (36:12), and revisit their 2009 Analysis exchange (44:27).

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Filed under Philosophy of Language, x-phi

by | April 13, 2014 · 8:47 pm

Jennifer Nagel and Joshua Alexander

Jennifer Nagel and Joshua Alexander on epistemic intuitions and experimental philosophy.

Note: This is part of a series of PTV discussions involving contributors to Machery and O’Neill (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy (2014)

Do you prefer Youtube? Go here.

After discussing the central role that intuitions have traditionally played in epistemology, Alexander and Nagel turn to problems raised by experimental work on cultural variation in epistemic intuitions. They discuss Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich’s influential 2001 study on Gettier intuitions—and subsequent failures to replicate the results of that study. Then (20:14) they discuss whether and to what extent intuitions are viable as data in epistemology (Alexander has often been more critical of the use of intuitions than Nagel). Along the way, Nagel makes the case for a plurality of methods (32:54). They discuss how we could tell whether a given empirical result undermines the reliability of intuitions (43:10); whether traditional “armchair” philosophy really is introspective in the way that it’s sometimes made out to be (47:00); and the nature of philosophical expertise (54:47).

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Filed under Epistemology, Methodology, x-phi

by | March 5, 2014 · 9:41 pm

Joshua Knobe and Eddy Nahmias

Joshua Knobe and Eddy Nahmias on experimental approaches to free will.

Note: This is part of a series of PTV discussions involving contributors to Machery and O’Neill (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy (2014)

Do you prefer Youtube? Go here.

Knobe and Nahmias begin with an overview of the early history and aims of experimental philosophy. Then they discuss experiments on the contrast between bypassing and throughpassing intuitions about free will (8:57); Nahmias’s “theory lite view,” according to which ordinary people have no strong views about the relation between mind and brain (17:34); whether the folk have a causal or an interventionist view of agency (24:17); the effect of descriptions of determinism on folk intuitions (32:52); and Nahmias’s work on “willusionism,” inspired by his critical view of certain popularized versions of free-will skepticism (41:47). Finally, Knobe and Nahmias consider future results that could resolve some of their disagreements (48:49) and forecast the next big steps in experimental philosophy of free will (57:00).

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Filed under Epistemology, Philosophy of Action, x-phi

by | November 18, 2010 · 9:28 am

Tamar Gendler and Stephen Stich

Tamar Gendler (left) and Stephen Stich (right) on gender and philosophical intuition.

Empirical evidence collected by Stich and Buckwalter suggests that “standard” intuitions about philosophical thought experiments (e.g. Gettier cases) are more common among men than women. Stich and Gendler examine the merits of this evidence. They consider what might explain gendered differences in intuitions, and whether such differences can help to explain why women are underrepresented in professional philosophy. They also discuss alternative explanations for the gender gap, including the effects of sexism and the shortage of female professors and graduate students to serve as role models for female undergraduates. Finally, they ask why a gender gap has been a larger problem in philosophy than other fields.

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Filed under Methodology, The Profession, x-phi

by | October 10, 2010 · 5:33 pm

Don Fallis and Roy Sorensen

Don Fallis (left) and Roy Sorensen (right) on lying.

This episode is about knitting. Is the previous sentence a lie? Not according to the standard analysis, which requires that a lie must involve an intention to deceive. But the standard analysis faces surprisingly many challenges. In this conversation, Fallis and Sorensen examine those challenges, and consider an alternative analysis in terms of insincere assertion. Along the way, they discuss the methodology and value of this kind of analysis.

The Pepsi commercial mentioned at 50:16 is here.

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Filed under Methodology, Philosophy of Language, Value Theory, x-phi

by | September 19, 2010 · 6:00 pm

Andy Egan and Joshua Knobe

Joshua Knobe (left) and Andy Egan (right) on moral relativism.

Knobe explains his surprising research suggesting that folk intuitions are more closely aligned with relativism than philosophers often assume. Egan describes his ongoing work on relativist semantics. Knobe presses Egan on whether Egan’s views provide a satisfactory account of moral disagreement and of the grounds for criticism of an ideally coherent sadist. Along the way, they discuss whether philosophical analysis of shared concepts ought to be “hermeneutic” or “revolutionary.”

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Filed under Metaethics, Methodology, Philosophy of Language, x-phi