Alvin Goldman and Jennifer Lackey

Alvin Goldman (left) and Jennifer Lackey (right) on social epistemology.

Can a football team know more than its individual members know? How can a non-expert tell that an expert’s testimony is trustworthy? How should we modify our beliefs in response to disagreements with others? These are some of the questions encompassed by social epistemology, […]

Christopher Gauker and Kathrin Glüer

Christopher Gauker (left) and Kathrin Glüer (right) on the contents of perception.

According to one view, perceptions have propositional content: they tell us that the world is a certain way, and what they tell us can be either true or false. In this debate, Glüer defends that view against Gauker’s attack. Glüer and Gauker […]

Alex Byrne and Brie Gertler

Alex Byrne (left) and Brie Gertler (right) on self-knowledge of beliefs.

In this conversation, Byrne and Gertler closely examine Gareth Evans’s “transparency procedure” for gaining self-knowledge of beliefs. According to the transparency procedure, one determines whether one believes that p simply by considering whether p is true (rather than via direct access to one’s […]

Adam Elga, Joshua Schechter, and Roger White

Adam Elga (left), Joshua Schechter (middle), and Roger White (right) on the problem of contingency.

Your beliefs about matters such as politics, religion, and morality are contingent on epistemically irrelevant factors like the time and place of your birth. Does this worry you? Should it? Elga maintains that this sort of contingency of […]

David Christensen and Roy Sorensen

David Christensen (left) and Roy Sorensen (right) on the epistemology of disagreement.

Christensen is a prominent defender of conciliationism, the view that you ought to give the same weight to the opinions of your epistemic peers as to your own opinions. Accordingly, if you believe that p is true while your peer disagrees—and if […]

Peter Carruthers and Eric Schwitzgebel

Peter Carruthers (left) and Eric Schwitzgebel (right) on self-knowledge of attitudes.

According to an intuitively plausible and widely accepted view, we have direct, privileged, and highly reliable access to our own beliefs. In the first part of this conversation, Carruthers and Schwitzgebel both reject that view, while disagreeing about the exact implications of empirical […]

Tamar Gendler and Eric Schwitzgebel

Tamar Gendler (left) and Eric Schwitzgebel (right) on implicit associations and belief.

Most of us explicitly renounce racist beliefs. Yet empirical work suggests that, for many people, their implicit racial associations are in tension with their explicit avowals. So what do we really believe? Gendler contends that, in general, our implicit associations (which she […]