Victor Kumar and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Victor Kumar and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong on moral disgust.

Note: We recorded this episode on the fly at RoME in August 2014. The production quality is non-ideal (putting it mildly) but the audio is crystal clear.

How should we respond to the feeling of disgust? Is disgustingness evidence of immorality? There are some clear cases […]

Jennifer Nagel and Joshua Alexander

Jennifer Nagel and Joshua Alexander on epistemic intuitions and experimental philosophy.

Note: This is part of a series of PTV discussions involving contributors to Machery and O’Neill (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy (2014)

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After discussing the central role that intuitions have traditionally played in epistemology, Alexander and […]

Joshua Knobe and Eddy Nahmias

Joshua Knobe and Eddy Nahmias on experimental approaches to free will.

Note: This is part of a series of PTV discussions involving contributors to Machery and O’Neill (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy (2014)

Do you prefer Youtube? Go here.

Knobe and Nahmias begin with an overview of the early history and aims of […]

Michael Strevens and J.D. Trout

Michael Strevens and J.D. Trout on explanation and understanding in science (and beyond).

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In science and in ordinary life, we want to explain and understand features of the world around us. How can we tell a good explanation from a bad one? What’s the connection between explanation and […]

Philip Goff and David Papineau

Philip Goff (left) and David Papineau (right) on physicalism.

Goff rejects physicalism. Papineau accepts it. In this episode, they examine the arguments on each side. They consider the much-discussed “knowledge argument” against physicalism (10:28), explore Goff’s own reasons for rejecting physicalism (17:23), weigh the dualist arguments of Chalmers and Jackson (27:21), discuss Papineau’s reasons […]

Mark Alfano and Abrol Fairweather

Mark Alfano (left) and Abrol Fairweather (right) on virtue epistemology.

A long line of virtue ethicists believe that we need to understand the moral virtues—courage, benevolence, temperance, etc.—in order to address core questions in moral philosophy. Lately, there has been a surge of interest in virtue epistmeology, which holds that core questions in epistemology […]

Owen Flanagan and Alex Rosenberg

Owen Flanagan (left) and Alex Rosenberg (right) on the significance of naturalism.

Naturalists believe that the world is scientifically intelligible (at least in principle). Thus, naturalists doubt the reality of anything that cannot fit into a scientific worldview. How discomforting are naturalists’ doubts? Can naturalists coherently regard life as meaningful? Rosenberg is happily pessimistic […]

Matt Bedke and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Matt Bedke (left) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (right) on ethical intuitions.

Bedke and Sinnott-Armstrong consider the extent to which we can justifiably trust our ethical intuitions. They discuss the analogy between ethical intuitions and color perceptions (2:55), a potential difference between ethical intuitions and non-ethical philosophical intuitions (19:45), Sinnott-Armstrong’s work on framing effects (27:11), and […]

Jonathan Weisberg and Kenny Easwaran

Jonathan Weisberg (left) and Kenny Easwaran (right) on full and partial belief.

An epistemic agent might be more deeply committed to some of her beliefs (e.g., that 2+2=4) than others (e.g., that Obama will be re-elected in 2012). In light of this, many philosophers want to distinguish between full and partial belief. But what […]

Graham Hubbs and Michael O’Rourke

Graham Hubbs (left) and Michael O’Rourke (right) on philosophical intervention.

The Toolbox Project, helmed by O’Rourke, applies philosophy to problems of cross-disciplinary cooperation among scientists. In this interview, Hubbs and O’Rourke discuss the goals and methods of the project, the stigma of applied philosophy, and the extent to which deep philosophical issues (e.g. in […]