Mike Titelbaum and Jonathan Weisberg on Bayesianism.
Titelbaum and Weisberg begin by addressing the question of what (if anything) Bayesians have in common. They review historically important intra-Bayesian debates about interpretations of probability, including “objective” and “subjective” interpretations. Then (15:17) they discuss the interplay between mathematicians’ views of probability and philosophical Bayesianism. They consider (23:44) debates about diachronic norms (which concern how subjective probabilities ought to change over time). Then they turn to contemporary developments. They discuss Bayesianism and knowledge (27:01); Bayesianism and social epistemology (32:50); the uniqueness thesis (35:40); Titelbaum’s subjectivism about evidential standards (42:03); Weisberg’s objectivist qualms about Titelbaum’s subjectivism (50:03); whether Titelbaum’s subjectivism permits too much intra-personal instability in credences over time (55:25); and the relation between beliefs and preferences (1:05:57).