Monthly Archives: November 2016

Mike Titelbaum and Jonathan Weisberg on Bayesianism.

Titelbaum and Weisberg begin by addressing the question of what (if anything) Bayesians have in common. They review historically important intra-Bayesian debates about interpretations of probability, including “objective” and “subjective” interpretations. Then (15:17) they discuss the interplay between mathematicians’ views of probability and philosophical Bayesianism. They consider (23:44) debates about diachronic norms (which concern how subjective probabilities ought to change over time). Then they turn to contemporary developments. They discuss Bayesianism and knowledge (27:01); Bayesianism and social epistemology (32:50); the uniqueness thesis (35:40); Titelbaum’s subjectivism about evidential standards (42:03); Weisberg’s objectivist qualms about Titelbaum’s subjectivism (50:03); whether Titelbaum’s subjectivism permits too much intra-personal instability in credences over time (55:25); and the relation between beliefs and preferences (1:05:57).

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Elizabeth Barnes and Joseph Stramondo on disability.

Philosophers have traditionally argued (or simply assumed) that disability must have a net negative effect on well-being—and not just because of contingent social facts, but also in virtue of the inherent nature of disability itself. This view is markedly less prevalent outside of philosophy departments, and is not widely shared by disabled persons themselves. Stramondo and Barnes begin their conversation by discussing why philosophers’ views of disability have drifted away from the views of non-philosophers (3:19). They discuss whether philosophers suffer from a “lack of moral imagination” with respect to disability (9:10), and provide personal reflections on their own experiences with disability (19:03). Then they consider the meaning and significance of “disability pride” (35:37). Finally, they discuss a few examples of the ways in which disability can actually enhance one’s life (53:08).

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